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Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals 
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
Courtney Shaw* 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 31, 2000, a federal district court judge in California handed 
down a decision that disposed of a potentially groundbreaking human rights 
case.1 In Doe v. Unocal Corp.,2 Judge Ronald S.W. Lew granted defendant 
Unocal's motion for summary judgment,3 thereby dismissing claims brought by 
fifteen Burmese villagers4 under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(ATCA).5 The plaintiffs sought to hold the defendant, a California-based 
energy company, liable for human rights violations committed by the Burmese 
military in :furtherance of defendant's pipeline venture. An earlier version of 
the case, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal,6 
• J.D. candidate, Stanford Law School, 2003; A.B., magna cum laude, Duke 
University, 2000; Executive Editor, Stanford Law Review, Volume 55; law clerk for the 
Hon. Vaughn R. Walker, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 
2003-04. The original version of this paper was written for Professor Abraham Sofaer's 
Spring 200 I class in Transnational Law. Many thanks to Professor Sofaer for his wise 
counsel and generosity in pointing me to this issue and helping me develop this paper. 
Thanks also to Kyle Christopher Wong and the editors of the Stanford Law Review for their 
excellent editing and advice, to Matthew Kahn for being my partner in crime, and to Lucas 
Huizar for his patience and support. 
1. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d. 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (Unocal V). 
2. I will refer to the various Unocal decisions with Roman numerals reflecting the 
order in which they were decided. 
3. Id. at 1312. 
4. Id. at 1295. 
5. Id. at 1303. Plaintiffs also filed claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, IS U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., and the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. These claims were disposed on summary judgment; additionally, a number of pendent 
California state causes of action were dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 1312. 
6. 176 F.R.D. 329 (1997) (Unocal II). The plaintiffs in this proceeding included a 
group of unions. One union consisted of the displaced Burmese government. The court 
determined that the union did not have standing to sue in its capacity as a foreign 
government, because it was not currently the official government of Burma. Id. at 338. Nor 
did the displaced government have the capacity to sue on behalf of the people of Burma. Id. 
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1360 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1359 
had held that allegations that Unocal "may have been a willing participant" in 
the Burmese military action would permit the federal district court to exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction.7 However, the decision in Unocal Vheld that the 
evidence was insufficient to survive a summary judgment motion. Although 
the litigation was dismissed, the issues raised by the case remain pertinent and 
unresolved.8 'When an energy company undertakes ventures abroad, is it liable 
in United States federal court for human rights violations committed in 
connection with its operations in those foreign countries?9 
This issue is important to multinational companies, and to energy 
companies in particular. Multinational energy companies are among the largest 
companies in the world. Their ventures around the globe tend to expose them 
to a wide variety of societal conditions, including many human rights and 
environmental problems.10 Additionally, energy companies face a unique set of 
circumstances in performing their work. First, the resources they are seeking 
are often found in less-developed countries. For the governments of such 
countries, these resources are often a primary supply of income.11 Second, 
resource extraction work usually involves constructing complicated 
infrastructure at the site and utilizes a good deal of hard labor.12 As a result, 
energy companies often confront particularly grave human rights conditions. 
Finally, many energy companies engage in a practice that has been termed 
"militarized commerce," meaning that they rely on the military forces of their 
host country to provide security for their projects.13 Certainly when companies 
engage foreign military or paramilitary forces in this fashion, they run the risk 
of fending off lawsuits for any human rights abuses committed by those forces 
in conjunction with the projects. 
A proliferation of recent litigation demonstrates that extraterritorial liability 
under the ATCA has become a serious issue for the operation of multinational 
energy companies. The Unocal litigation in the Ninth· Circuit is but one 
example of this trend. For example, in the late 1990s, two cases in the Second 
Circuit dealt with multinational oil companies being sued by foreign plaintiffs 
at 340. The court also found that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue as a representative 
of the people :of Burma The court also dismissed claims under the ATCA by a private 
organization, the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FUTB). While the FUTB had 
standing for separate negligence claims, it did not have standing, either in its own right or as 
an association on behalf of its members, to sue for the ATCA claims. Id. at 343, 344. 
7. Id. at 348. 
8. As of this writing, these issues have not been affirmed or overturned on appeal. 
9. This Note will not address possible liability in state court. 
10. See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating 
International Law, 4 UCLA J. lNr'LL. & FOREIGN A.FF. 81, 82 (1999). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Craig Forcese, ATCA 's Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law 
and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 YALEJ. lNr'LL. 487, 489 (2001). 
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under the ATCA for violation of international law.14 One case, which was 
ultimately dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, involved 
environmental claims against Texaco for its operations in Ecuador.15 The 
second case, which was also dismissed on forum non conveniens, involved 
human rights claims against Shell in Nigeria.16 More recently, a lawsuit has 
14. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 
U.S. 941 (2001); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 745 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000). 
15. This case involved a set of purely environmental claims. Texaco conducts oil-
producing activities in the Oriente region of Ecuador. The plaintiffs in the case alleged that 
this American oil company, as part of a joint venture with the national Ecuadorian oil 
company, injured the environment in the region by mishandling waste generated by oil 
exploration and extraction, rupturing pipelines, and initiating oil spills. In addition, 
environmental activists reported that the damage to the environment has caused dislocation 
of indigenous peoples and exposed them to disease. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note I 0, at 99-100. 
The litigation was originally commenced as Sequihua v. Texaco, 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. 
Tex. 1994), in state court in Texas with no ATCA cause of action. The case was removed to 
federal court and subsequently dismissed. Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 63. A different set of 
plaintiffs then filed claims arising out of the same set of violations, this time under the 
ATCA in federal court in New York, Texaco's home base. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 100. 
The substantive issues raised by the allegations have not yet been reached. Instead, the 
motions have all involved issues of international comity and forum non conveniens. The 
Second Circuit held in 1998 that, unless Texaco was willing to submit itself to jurisdiction in 
Ecuador, the case could go forward in the Southern District of New York. Jota v. Texaco, 
Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998). Texaco then consented to the jurisdiction of the 
Ecuadorian courts and renewed its motions to dismiss in district court. Aguinda v. Texaco, 
Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 745, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2000). New 
political developments in Ecuador, however, challenged the previous findings that the 
country would be able to provide a just forum for adjudication of the case. Id. at 5. The 
district court ordered that the record be reopened so that the parties could submit more 
information on this issue. Id. at 10. In May of2001, however, the court declined to find that 
the new conditions rendered Ecuador an unacceptable forum and dismissed the case on 
forum non conveniens grounds. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 554 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
16. This case involves purely human rights claims in Nigeria One part of Nigeria, 
known as Ogoniland, is a prolific oil-producing region, providing up to 75 percent of the 
budget that supports the military dictatorship in Nigeria Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 94-95. 
The Nigerian government has had a history of mismanagement of government money, 
resulting in poor social and economic conditions. See Scott Dolezal, The Systematic Failure 
to Interpret Article IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is There a 
Public Emergency in Nigeria?, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1163, 1165 (2000). Despite 
promises that the people of Ogoniland would see more of the revenue brought in by the oil 
industry, very little progress has been made, and human rights violations continue. Id. at 
1165-66. In addition, the oil companies operating in Ogoniland (including Shell, Elf 
Aquitaine, Agip, Mobil, Texaco, and Chevron) have caused extensive environmental damage 
in the region. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 95. After being ignored by both the government 
and the oil companies, the native people, led by a man named Ben Saro-Wiwa, began to 
retaliate through various acts of sabotage. Dolezal, supra, at 1166. In response, Shell's 
Nigerian subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), asked the 
Nigerian military for assistance. A brutal military crackdown ensued. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 
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been filed in the District of Columbia against Exxon Mobil for alleged human 
rights abuses committed by the Indonesian military, which the company had 
used as security in its natural gas projects in that country.17 Although none of 
these ATCA cases has yet resulted in a successful judgment for the plaintiffs, 
they represent a trend with which multinational oil companies must contend. 
One problem in determining whether a company might potentially be liable 
for its actions abroad is that there is no federal statute that squarely addresses 
the answer to this question.18 Commentators and lawyers alike have called for 
statutory codification of guidelines to aid American multinational oil 
companies in making decisions in this regard. 19 For example, one lawyer 
stated: 
So, why am I troubled by the Unocal doctrine? That's the problem-it should 
not be a judicial doctrine, it should be a statute. As a doctrine, it's much easier 
IO, at 95. Leaders of the Ogoni people, including Saro-Wiwa, were tortured and eventually 
hanged. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92. 
Saro-Wiwa's estate and the widow of another Ogoni leader then filed suit against the 
Royal Dutch Shell family under the ATCA in the Southern District of New York Zia-Zarifi, 
supra note IO, at 95. Complainants alleged that SPDC actively recruited the Nigerian 
military to attack and suppress the Ogoni people who opposed the company. Wiwa, 226 
F.3d at 92-93. They contended that the SPDC had either conspired or endorsed extrajudicial 
murder, torture, and crimes against humanity. Zia-Zarifi, supra note I 0, at 95-96. As in the 
Texaco litigation, the district court never reached the merits of the claims and dismissed the 
case on forum non conveniens grounds in 1998. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 
96 Civ. 8386, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23064, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998). The Second 
Circuit then reversed and remanded the case back to the district court. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 
108. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in March of 2001. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, Co. v. Wiwa, 532 U.S. 941 (2001). 
17. Eric Marcks, Avoiding Liability for Human Rights Violations in Project Finance, 
22 ENERGY L.J. 301, 301 n.4 (2001). See also Exxon Mobil Sued in U.S. Court for Human 
Rights Abuses in Indonesia, available at http://www.laborrights.org (last visited Jan. 7, 
2002). Reportedly, the Indonesian government had a history of oppressing the Indonesian 
province of Aceh, and a separatist movement had developed within that region. Aceh had 
been designated by the former dictator of Indonesia as a military operational area in 1989. 
Subsequent to this designation, the Indonesian military maimed, tortured, raped, and killed 
thousands of citizens of Aceh. Aceh is also an area rich in oil and natural gas, and Exxon 
Mobil developed resource extraction facilities there. In doing so, it contracted with the 
government of Indonesia, which was still under a brutal dictatorship, to obtain security for 
the project. The complaint alleges, among other things, that Exxon Mobil entered into those 
contracts with the government of Indonesia knowing that military troops would be deployed 
as security, and that such troops were likely to inflict grave human rights abuses on the 
people of Aceh, including genocide, murder, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual 
violence, and kidnapping. Complaint of Plaintiff, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (D.D.C. June 
11, 2001), available at http://www.laborrights.org (last yisited Jan. 7, 2002). 
18. Such federal legislation has been proposed. See David I. Becker, A Call for the 
Codification of the UNOCAL Doctrine, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 183, 202-205 (1998) (setting 
out pertinent parts of such legislation and describing its effects). 
19. See, e.g., id. at 205-07 (detailing arguments that support the enactment of such 
federal legislation). 
20. Referring to the 1997 decision of Unocal II. 
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to applaud than to apply. It strikes a blow for human rights against an alleged 
violator, but it offers virtually no guidance to companies that want to avoid a 
violation. All the doctrine does is warn companies very generally that they 
should not knowingly benefit from a governmental business partner's 
violations of human rights.21 
In the absence of such legislation, however, the only guidelines that energy 
companies can utilize are a patchwork of doctrines developed in the recent 
cases dealing with the subject. 
This Note examines the most important of those doctrines: a responsibility 
standard articulated by Judge Lew in the Unocal V decision. This standard, 
which essentially attempts to define when a company may be held responsible 
for the bad acts of foreign governments, determines whether subject matter 
jurisdiction will lie under the ATCA. In this regard, Part I of this Note explores 
the legal foundations of the Unocal case-the history of the ATCA and issues 
encountered in its early use in human rights litigation. Specifically, these 
issues are the problems of establishing the ATCA as a substantive right of 
action, determining that private actors are liable under the ATCA in some 
circumstances, and defining the boundaries of the class of violations that the 
ATCA covers. In Part II, this Note reviews the circumstances of the Unocal 
case itself and details the actual standard for responsibility laid out in the 
Unocal V case, a standard that is premised on imputing color of state law on 
private actors through a joint action test developed in American civil rights 
jurisprudence. In Part ill, this Note describes several possible alternatives to 
the responsibility standard articulated in Unocal V, some of which could be 
more problematic for multinational energy companies. First, it explores other 
possible interpretations of the joint action test. Second, it explores other tests 
in civil rights jurisprudence for imputing color of law on private actors. After 
finding that applying any of the civil rights doctrine may not be appropriate, it 
finally explores several alternative standards of liability: state responsibility, 
joint liability for a tort, and accomplice liability. This Note concludes that the 
last two alternatives may be more appropriate than the Unocal standard, but 
that substantial uncertainty for multinational oil companies remains, since the 
standard has yet to be addressed on appellate review or by a statute. 
21. Gregory Wallace, Fallout From Slave-Labor Case is Troubling, N.J.L.J., Dec. 8, 
1997, at 24, available at LEXIS, News, News Group File, All (referring to the 1997 decision 
of Unocal JI). 
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I. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS Acr 
A. Early History 
The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, was part of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789.22 The original statute said: "[The district courts] shall also have 
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit 
courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.''23 It has been 
modified three times subsequently24 and now reads: "The District Courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 
Several reasons have been posited as to the original purpose of the ATCA. 
One view is that it was primarily a response to national security concerns-its 
drafters were concerned about the consequences of denying a judicial forum to 
foreigners. 25 Another theory is that the drafters did not want to discourage 
settlement and investment in the United States by foreigners, and felt that 
declining to provide a judicial forum would have such a negative effect.26 A 
third idea is that the ATCA's chief purpose was to provide a judicial forum to 
foreign ambassadors in America.27 One final theory is that it was intended to 
be a "badge ofhonor''28 for the young United States, indicating that the country 
was ready to shoulder a perceived national duty to enforce international law as 
it related to individual conduct.29 Although it is improbable that the clear 
rationale of the statute's original drafters can be discerned, it is generally 
thought that the statute now covers a more broad range of violations of the law 
of nations than those recognized at the time ofits enactment.30 Now it creates a 
forum available to aliens in any situation in which the United States has a duty 
to hear claims under international law.31 
22. Judiciazy Act ofl 789, ch. 20, 9(b ), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
23. Becker, supra note 18, at 189. 
24. Id. 
25. Jeffrey Rabkin, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in International 
Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120, 2125 (1995). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at2125-26. 
28. Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge 
of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'LL. 461 (1989). 
29. Id. at475. 
30. Professor Abraham D. Sofaer, Transnational Human Rights Litigation in the 
United States: Present Status and Future Potential, Presentation to Susman Godfrey L.L.P. 
Retreat 8-9 (Sept. 2000) (transcript available from Pro£ Sofaer, Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University). 
31. Id. 
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Although some claims were brought under the ATCA at the beginning of 
nationhood, the statute traditionally was overlooked and was not considered an 
especially important piece of legislation. 32 Indeed, the statute was invoked 
successfully only five times in its first 200 years, making it a rather ineffective 
source of relief.33 Judge Henry Friendly described the ATCA as "a kind of 
legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary 
Act ... no one seems to know whence it came."34 The ATCA was resuscitated 
as a tool for human rights litigation in 1980 with the Second Circuit's decision 
in Filartiga v. Pena-Ira/a, where the court held that the ATCA authorized 
liability for torture committed under color of state authority.35 In 1995, it 
gained further attention in another Second Circuit decision, Kadic v. Karadzic, 
which expanded the statute's reach to private actors in some circumstances.36 
B. Mere Jurisdiction or a Substantive Right of Action? 
One important issue that has been raised in past ATCA litigation is whether 
the statute actually creates a substantive cause of action. The statute could be 
read as simply a grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the kinds of cases it 
covers.37 Several recent cases, however, have interpreted the statute more 
broadly, holding that in addition to conferring jurisdiction, it creates an 
actionable claim.38 The first case to do so was the Filartiga decision.39 In that 
case, two Paraguayan citizens accused the former Inspector General of 
Paraguay of torturing and killing one of their family members. They alleged 
that such official torture violated the law of nations and was actionable under 
the ATCA.40 The district court dismissed the case before reaching its merits.41 
The Second Circuit, however, reversed this finding and allowed the case to 
proceed.42 Although the court never explicitly stated in the case that the ATCA 
32. Rabkin, supra note 25, at 2126. 
33. Id. at 2126 n.31. 
34. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). Lohengrin was a 
legendary figure most famously depicted in Wagner's opera of the same name. He was an 
enigmatic knight who would not reveal his full identity to his bride. See Rabkin, supra note 
25, at2126 n.32. 
35. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
36. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1005 (1996). 
37. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811 (Bork, J., 
concurring). 
38. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876; Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232. 
39. Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights 
Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. LoUJS U. L.J. 539, 540 (1997). 
40. Becker, supra note 18, at 190. 
41. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
42. See id. 
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created a substantive right of action, it indirectly supported this proposition; 
and subsequent authorities have taken Filartiga to stand for this idea.43 
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of a private right of 
action under the ATCA,44 whether such a right currently exists may depend on 
the circuit in which the case is brought. The Second Circuit reaffirmed its 
decision in Filartiga with its decision in Karadzic. That case found a 
substantive right of action for citizens with respect to certain war crimes, such 
as genocide, rape, forced prostitution, arbitrary detention, summary execution, 
and wrongful death.45 Three other circuits have reached the cause of action 
issue, and two of them have followed the lead of the Second Circuit. 46 The 
Ninth Circuit did so in 1994 with its decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand E. 
Marcos Human Rights Litigation;41 the Eleventh Circuit followed suit in 1996 
with Abebe-Jira v. Negewo.48 
The remaining circuit to encounter the question was the D.C. Circuit, 
which dealt with the issue in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.49 The claims 
in that case, brought by survivors of a group of Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) murder victims, were dismissed by a three-judge panel, 
each of whom wrote a separate concurring opinion. They differed in their 
views of the ATCA.50 Judge Edwards, while supporting the dismissal of the 
claims because non-state actors committed them, did accept the proposition that 
the ATCA granted a substantive right of action in some cases. 51 Judge Bork, on 
the other hand, supported dismissal of the claims because in his view, the 
ATCA only conferred jurisdiction.52 Any right of action would have to come 
from a separate source, not including customary international law or the federal 
common law.53 Judge Robb declined to address the issues raised by Edwards 
and Bork about the ATCA and concluded instead that the courts should not 
decide the claims because they were inherently political. 54 
43. Becker, supra note 18, at 190. 
44. Id. at 192. 
45. Rabkin,supranote25, at2128-29. 
46. Becker, supra note 18, at 191. 
47. 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We thus join the Second Circuit in 
concluding that the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, creates a cause of action for violations 
of specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards .... "). 
48. 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[TheATCA] establishes a federal forum where 
courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary 
international law."). 
49. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774. 
50. Becker, supra note 18, at 191. 
51. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777-82 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
52. See id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). 
53. See id. at 809-11. 
54. See id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). 
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Part of the controversy was settled in a federal statute passed in 1992. The 
Torture Victims Protection Act created a cause of action for anyone (including 
both aliens and U.S. citizens) for torture or extrajudicial killing committed by 
anyone acting under "actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any 
foreign nation. "55 The TVP A would seem to replace the ATCA as the basis for 
a private cause of action with respect to official torture. Its implications for 
ATCA causes of action generally, however, are perhaps less clear. On the one 
hand, the passage of the TVP A could mean that Congress only intends a cause 
of action for violations of international law that it has expressly enumerated 
through legislation, and that the ATCA is merely a jurisdictional statute.56 On 
the other hand, the House Report on the TVP A indicates that Congress felt 
official torture is something that merits individual attention, and that the TVP A 
does not limit the ATCA' s application to other violations of international law.57 
Given this statement, it is more likely that the TVP A will not strip the ATCA of 
its ability to grant a cause of action. 58 
C. State or Private Action? 
Another important issue for ATCA litigation is whether plaintiffs may 
invoke the statute against both state and private actors. It is clear that the 
ATCA does not grant federal courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns-the 
Supreme Court has held that the only source of jurisdiction over foreign states 
is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).59 The FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 
1330, et. seq., codifies the common law doctrine that foreign sovereigns, their 
agencies, and their instrumentalities are generally immune from suit in U.S. 
courts.60 The FSIA is subject to numerous exceptions;61 and if a plaintiff seeks 
55. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2000). This Act effectively implemented through 
legislation the Torture Convention, which the United States ratified in 1988. See Sofaer, 
supra note 30, at 26. 
56. Walker, supra note 39, at 551; see also Christopher W. Haffke, The Torture 
Victims Protection Act: More Symbol than Substance, 43 EMORYL.J. 1467, 1481 (1994). 
57. H.R Rep. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 
("Official torture and summary execution merit special attention in a statute expressly 
addressed to those practices. At the same time, claims based on torture or summary 
execution do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately by covered by section 
1350. That statute should remain intact to pennit suits based on other norms that already 
exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law."). 
58. Haffke, supra note 56, at 1481. 
59. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). 
60. Rabkin, supra note 25, at 2132. This doctrine was first clearly articulated by Chief 
Justice John Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 
(1812). The grant of immunity is set out in § 1604: "Subject to existing international 
agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a 
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of 
the States except as provided i~ sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." 
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to bring suit against a sovereign state in federal court, then it must produce 
evidence that such an exception applies. 62 Only when one of these exceptions 
has been established63 can the ATCA be invoked as a source of jurisdiction.64 
Although the FSIA limits the range of possible state defendants, it says 
nothing about private defendants. The Second Circuit's decision in Karadzic 
established that, at least in some circumstances, a private actor can be held 
liable under the ATCA. Although prior decisions, including the district court's 
ruling in Karadzic, had assumed that the ATCA required state action, 65 the 
circuit court held that this was not always the case.66 Karadzic involved a 
group of Croat and Muslim citizens who filed a claim under the ATCA in New 
York against Radovan Karadzic, leader of the "Srpska" area of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. They accused him of various atrocities, including genocide, war 
crimes, rape, and forced prostitution. 67 The Second Circuit found that private 
parties could be liable for certain classes of international violations. It noted 
that private parties had previously been held liable for piracy, the slave trade, 
and war crimes.68 It then divided the plaintiffs' claims into three different 
categories: (1) genocide; (2) war crimes; (3) other instances of inflicting death, 
torture, and degrading treatment. It found that a private actor such as Karadzic 
could be held liable for the first two categories.69 
In addition to sovereign states and purely private parties, a third category 
of possible defendants is private parties acting under the color of state law. 
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (detailing exceptions for waivers, commercial activities 
carried on in the United States, property rights, and money damages for personal injury, 
wrongful death, or damage or loss of property). For an interesting discussion about how 
state violation of certain international norms may be analogous to Eleventh Amendment 
implied waivers, see Rabkin, supra note 25, at 2149-54. 
62. Phaneufv. Republic oflndonesia, 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997). 
63. An extensive discussion of FSIA jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this paper. 
A large body of law exists on the proper invocation of the § 1605 exceptions. See, e.g., 
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (discussing the proper 
interpretation of the commercial exception); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) 
(analyzing the proper scope of the commercial exception); De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 
488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980) (dealing with the proper interpretation of the exception for 
money damages for tortious property damage). 
64. See Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 443. 
65. See Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 740-41(S.D.N.Y.1994). 
66. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
67. Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, The Alien Tort Claims Act, N.Y.L.J., 
Dec. 29, 1995, at3. 
68. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 239-40; Newman & Burrows, supra note 67, at 4. 
69. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 241-44; Newman & Burrows, supra note 67, at 4. The court 
relied on the 1946 United Nations General Assembly decision that private parties could be 
liable for genocide, as well as the Convention on Genocide (ratified by 120 countries) to 
support its decision on genocide. It also relied on the Geneva Convention, which stated that 
all parties to a conflict are prohibited from committing certain crimes during war, as 
authority for its decision on war crimes. Id. at 241-42. 
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These cases are treated similarly to cases involving state officials with no 
immunity.10 Such defendants must be involved in the illegal conduct of state 
officials to a sufficient degree that they can be deemed responsible for such 
conduct. This particular classification of defendants is especially important in 
cases involving multinational energy companies.71 The issue that must be 
resolved is the standard applied in assessing responsibility. 
D. What Constitutes a Violation of International Law? 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to review any case invoking the 
ATCA.72 Most ATCA claims have therefore followed a pattern laid out in the 
two recent Second Circuit cases.73 According to these decisions, a claim should 
present three elements: (1) alien plaintiffs (2) suing for a tort (3) committed in 
violation of international law.74 The first requirement seems fairly 
straightforward.75 The second requirement has resulted in the expenditure of 
some judicial energy in ascertaining what the statute intended;76 however, the 
third prong is the most heavily contested issue because "it forces American 
courts to identify customary international law or treaties, establish their 
contents, and enforce their provisions in contexts where they have seldom, if 
ever, been used ... ,''77 
Originally, some courts held that the violation must not only be the breach 
of an internationally accepted customary law principle, but also one that 
requires private remedy.78 For example, the case of Dreyfas v. Von Finck79 held 
that deprivation of property due to religious discrimination did not constitute a 
claim under international law.80 The decision in Filartiga changed this norm. 
Now, most courts hold that a violation of international law is established if the 
conduct is universally recognized as wrong through international agreements, 
decisions, resolutions, and scholars.81 Absent such formal agreement, universal 
70. Sofaer, supra note 30, at 14-15. 
71. Id. at 15. 
72. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 90 n.27. 
73. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876; Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232. 
74. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 90; Walker, supra note 39, at 544. 
75. Some commentators believe that there is an asymmetiy with this requirement, 
because they feel it could afford more protection to aliens than to U.S. citizens for violations 
of international law. See Sofaer, supra note 30, at 9. 
76. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 90. See also Sofaer, supra note 30, at 10 (noting that 
maritime libel, contract violations, and pure injunctive relief have all been held to be 
invalid). 
77. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 90-91. 
78. Sofaer, supra note 30, at 11. 
79. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). 
80. "Like a general treaty, the law of nations has been held not to be self-executing so 
as to vest a plaintiff ,vith individual legal rights." Dreyfas, 534 F.2d at 31. 
81. Sofaer, supra note 30, at 11. 
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norms against certain conduct (for example, stealing) do not rise to the level of 
a violation.82 This standard closely resembles that of a jus cogens norm.83 
Claims that have been consistently upheld as sufficient include: piracy, slavery, 
torture, summary execution, genocide, and disappearance. 84 Claims that have 
been rejected as insufficient include: censorship, libel, stealing, fraud, 
embezzlement, conversion, tortious interference with business relationships, 
refusal to pay moneys due, misrepresentation, negligence, unseaworthiness, 
wrongful picketing, and environmental harms.85 
II. THE UNOCAL CASE AND THE CURRENT STANDARD FOR RESPONSIBILITY 
A. Case Background 
Multinational energy companies have faced several significant lawsuits 
brought against them under the ATCA.86 The litigation against Unocal is 
currently the most advanced of all the suits commenced against an oil 
company. The case arises out of what have been described as "the pharaonic 
excesses of Burma's military junta."87 The military took over Burma in 1988 
under the name State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In 
addition to changing Burma's name to Myanmar, SLORC imposed martial law 
and conducted an intense campaign to repress any pro-democracy movements 
within the country.ss It also pusheq a substantial portion of the Burmese 
population into forced labor and subjected them to many forms of abuse, 
including rape, torture, and killing. s9 
Beginning in 1991, several multinational oil companies began negotiating 
with SLORC about possible oil and gas ventures in Burma. In 1993, Unocal 
agreed to participate in a joint venture drilling project with the French oil 
company Total and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). The project 
involved the construction of the Yadana gas pipeline, which would transport oil 
and gas from the Andaman Sea across the Tenasserim region of Burma.90 The 
government, in furtherance of the goals of the project and funded by the oil 
companies, allegedly forced Burmese villagers to relocate, took away their 
82. Id. at 12. 
83. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 91. Ajus cogens norm is defined as "a mandatory 
norm of general international law from which no two or more nations may exempt 
themselves or release one another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (7th ed. 2000). 
84. Sofaer, supra note 30, at 11-12. 
85. Id. at 12. 
86. See notes 14-17, supra, and accompanying text. 
87. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 97. 
88. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 884 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (Unocal I). 
89. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 97. 
90. Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85. 
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property, forced them to labor on the pipeline, and killed or tortured those who 
objected.91 Meanwhile, much of the world condemned the situation in Burma.92 
For example, the United States has issued sanctions on new private investment 
in Burma, although it preserved existing investments in that country.93 
President Bill Clinton renewed them in May of 2000.94 
Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court in the Central District of California 
against Unocal, Total, MOGE, and SLORC, as well as two Unocal 
executives.95 A majority of their claims were based on the ATCA.96 The 
displaced government of Burma and Burmese labor unions filed a related case 
for claims arising out of the same circumstances.97 Judge Richard Paez rejected 
a motion to dismiss by Unocal98 and dispensed with several other preliminary 
matters.99 When Judge Lew took over the case, however, he finally granted the 
company's motion for summary judgment.100 Plaintiffs planned to appeal the 
decision to the Ninth Circuit. 101 , 
B. The Current Standard of Responsibility 
Multinational oil companies deal with numerous specialized issues with 
respect to human rights litigation under the ATCA.102 None is so significant as 
the standard for responsibility for the abuses allegedly committed against the 
91. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 97. 
92. See Burma: The Role of the International Community, Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2001, at http://wwwlhrw.org/wr2kl/asia/bunna3.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001). 
93. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE 
J. INr'L L. 1, 11 (2001). 
94. Id. 
95. Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 883. 
96. Id. at 889. 
97. Unocal II, 176 F.RD. 329. The case granted in part and denied in part Unocal's 
motion to dismiss. The reasoning in this case parallels the reasoning in the Unocal I line of 
cases. 
98. Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 898. 
99. Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 888 (granting motion to dismiss SLORC and MOGE due 
to immunity under the FSIA); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1190 (C.D.C. 
1998) (granting motion by French defendant Total for lack of personal jurisdiction) 
[hereinafter Unocal Ill]; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1147 (C.D.C. Aug. 5, 
1999) (denying plaintiff's motion for class certification) [hereinafter Unocal If']. 
100. Unocal V. 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1312. 
101. Special Issues and Campaigns: The Role of the International Community, Human 
Rights Watch World Report 2001, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/special/corporations3.html 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2002). 
102. There are many examples of such issues. Among the most important seem to be 
forum non conveniens (Aguinda, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6981 at 29-36, 57-58; Wiwa, 226 F. 3d at 
106), personal jurisdiction (Unocal III, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-89; Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 95-99), 
and the failure to join indispensable parties who are immune under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 888). 
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plaintiffs. As noted previously, a multinational oil company faces different 
issues of liability depending on whether a court finds that it is purely private or 
that it is acting under the color oflaw. Both issues are addressed in depth in the 
Unocal litigation, and these considerations proved to be dispositive in the 
decision to grant summary judgment to Unocal. 
1. Purely private action. 
As discussed earlier, private liability under the ATCA has been limited to a 
short list of the most well established human rights violations. A multinational 
oil company would presumably be held to this standard, though it does seem 
possible that an ambitious court could add more categories to that list. One 
category that has definitely been included, however, is the slave trade. The two 
judges who dealt with the Unocal litigation indicate that forced labor might 
reasonably be considered part of the slave trade for purposes of the ATCA.103 
The first judge, Judge Paez, dealt with the case during a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
for failure to state a claim, and he allowed the plaintiffs to proceed.104 Later, 
however, Judge Lew considered the claim as part of the more stringent standard 
for summary judgment.105 Lew said that the facts asserted by the plaintiffs 
were insufficient to prove that Unocal was responsible for the alleged forced 
labor. The plaintiff at this stage in the litigation must assert facts that could 
prove that the defendant had taken "active steps" in participating in the 
violation. Simply having knowledge that the violations were taldng place was 
insufficient under this test. 106 
One notable area of concern with respect to this stringent standard of 
liability for purely private actors is that in cases like Unocal, a potential 
plaintiff's only viable recourse is to sue the private company under the ATCA. 
Although they are usually the primary actors committing the violation, the state 
actors themselves will likely not be good targets for those plaintiffs. For one 
thing, they will probably not be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
unless they fulfill the requirements of the FSIA; 107 accordingly, victims will not 
be able to sue them under the ATCA. For another, they may face difficulties in 
103. See Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. 896; Unocal V, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307-08. 
104. Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 895 ("[A] court must not dismiss a complaint for failure 
to state a claim unless 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 
41, 45-46 (1957))). 
105. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. 
CIV. P. 56(c). 
106. Unocal V, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307-10. 
107. See notes 60-65, supra, and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional 
requirements). 
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obtaining personal jurisdiction over such defendants.108 Finally, the victims 
will probably not be able to sue them in their own countries, since most such 
governments have set up judicial systems that render them immune from this 
type of judgment.109 Since the ability to sue a private defendant is clearly of 
vital importance, plaintiffs have attempted to ensnare such private parties by an 
alternative means-impugnjng them with responsibility for the actions of state 
actors through the color of state law doctrine. 
2. Color of state law. 
As discussed in Part I, a private organization may incur the same type of 
liability as a state would face, provided that it is acting under color of state law. 
The Unocal series is the only one of the energy company cases to reach this 
issue.110 In determining whether Unocal could be held liable as a state actor, 
Judge Lew imported the jurisprudence of civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 as his guide. Using the§ 1983 standard was first suggested in theKadic 
case, which called the statute "a relevant guide to whether a defendant has 
engaged in official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort 
Act."lll The case, however, offered little guidance as to how that statute would 
be applied in ATCA cases, thus leading to a rather ad hoc application of its 
principles in such instances.112 Under the interpretation of that statute in Unocal 
V, a private party acts under the auspices of the state when it "acts together with 
state officials or with significant state aid."113 Judge Lew noted that "the Ninth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court have recognized that 'cases deciding when 
private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of 
consistency. "'114 He identified four different tests that had been used to 
examine whether a certain case met the state action requirement: public 
function, state compulsion, nexus, and joint action.115 
Plaintiffs in this case premised their claim on the joint action test, arguing 
that Unocal's involvement in the joint venture with SLORC and MOGE 
constituted joint action.116 The joint action test says that if a private party is a 
108. Forcese, supra note 13, at494. 
109. Id. For example, in Burma, the government simply ruled by decree and was not 
bound by any constitutional provisions. Although a British-era judicial system remained in 
place to some degree, its functioning was severely flawed, especially with respect to 
politicized cases. 
llO. Unocal V, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305-07. 
lll. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245. 
112. Forcese, supra note 13, at 50 I. 
113. Unocal v; 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. 
ll4. Id. (citing George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1127, 1230 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
115. Id. 
ll6. Id. 
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''willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents," then it is 
operating under the color of state law.117 Judge Lew noted that under this test, 
the state and private entities involved must share a common goal to commit the 
violations. 118 Although Unocal and SLORC shared the goal of "a profitable 
project," the judge did not think this was enough. Plaintiffs had not presented 
evidence that Unocal had actually participated in the military's abusive 
conduct, nor did they present evidence of a conspiracy to commit such 
violations. 119 
Next, Judge Lew stated that the state action test deals with situations where 
the private party itself, in concert with the state, had committed the challenged 
acts. In this case, however, it was the state that had committed the violations. 
When it is the state or its agents that commit the violations, then the private 
party must be the proximate cause of the violation, meaning that it exercised 
control over the decision to commit the violation.120 Judge Lew found that 
nothing in the record supported the proposition that Unocal had controlled the 
decisions of the Burmese military to commit the alleged violations; therefore, it 
could not be found to have acted under color of state law.121 
Because Unocal could not be liable either as a private or a state actor, 
Judge Lew granted summary judgment to the oil company. Should Lew's 
decision survive appeal, it has a number of important implications for future 
ATCA cases. First, mere lmowledge of human rights violations will not be 
enough to hold a multinational company liable; the company must have taken a 
more active role in the violations. The requirement of some action or decision 
making by the company appears essential in satisfying either the private action 
or the joint action test. Second, if future cases use§ 1983 state action tests, the 
only test that has been applied to energy companies is the joint action test. 
Because the plaintiffs premised their claim on joint action, the other three tests 
were never addressed in the Unocal I litigation. Third, Judge Lew's decision 
relied on American civil rights jurisprudence to come up with a standard of 
responsibility of companies for state actors. If a court chose to use a different 
standard, the analysis of responsibility might look very different. These last 
two points will be discussed further in the next part. 
III. ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS OF LIABILITY 
The liability standard articulated by Judge Lew is perhaps the most 
important issue a multinational energy company will encounter in ATCA 
117. Id. (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)). 
ll8. Id. at 1306 (citing Gallagherv. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1454 
(10th Cir. 1995)). 
119. Id. at 1306-07. 
120. At least in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1307. 
121. Id. 
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litigation. His interpretation of when a private company may be held 
responsible for human rights violations greatly limits the instances in which 
liability may attach. The question remains, however, whether the Unocal 
standard is the right one. 
There are two possible ways that future plaintiffs may attempt to get 
around this standard. One way is to work within the framework set up by 
Judge Lew. In analyzing how§ 1983 state action requirements might apply to 
multinational oil companies, Judge Lew examined joint action, which is only 
one out of the four tests that have been articulated under that statute. His 
analysis of the joint action test might be questioned. Additionally, the other 
three tests might supply a rationale for liability. A second method would be to 
argue that the § 1983 standard is inapplicable-that some other standard is 
more appropriate. These are discussed below. 
A. Options Under§ 1983 
In Unocal, the plaintiffs premised their defeated claims about state action 
on the§ 1983 concept of joint action. Some commentators have challenged the 
correctness of the judge's ruling on joint action in that case.122 Additionally, 
three other avenues are available under traditional § 1983 doctrine-the public 
function test, the nexus test, and the state compulsion test.123 None is directly 
addressed in the Unocal V opinion. 
1. The joint action test. 
Judge Lew's decision about the application of the joint action test is 
possibly incorrect itself. First, its analysis of the proximate cause 
requirement-that the_ private actor control the decisions of the state actor-
may not take sufficient account of recent cases dealing with proximate cause in 
the Ninth Circuit.124 The judge relied here on Arnold v. IBM, which held that 
the defendant must personally participate in the deprivation, which included 
both foreseeability and some degree of control over the other actor.125 The 
principle established in this case about control was seriously weakened in later 
decisions about proximate cause.126 A very recent Ninth Circuit decision, for 
example, held that the appropriate analysis for determining proximate cause 
122. Forcese, supra note 13, at 513. 
123. Unocal V, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305. 
124. Forcese, supra note 13, at 513. 
125. 637 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1981), as cited by Unocal V, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. 
126. See, e.g. Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 61 U.S. 
905 (1983) (holding that if a defendant sets in motion a series of acts that it knew or should 
have known would lead to the harm, then proximate cause is satisfied). 
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would be the traditional tort law examination of reasonable foreseeability. 127 
Under this test, proximate causation would probably be satisfied in the Unocal 
case, given that there was evidence that the company contracted with SLORC 
!mowing that the military organization was committing human rights 
violations. 128 
A second reason that the joint action test may have been misapplied is that 
the court may have overlooked the argument that Unocal did personally 
participate in the violation. The joint action in question may be defined as 
providing security for the pipeline project. Here, the company provided 
material and financial resources to the military organization. These resources 
were designed to help in the rendering of security services. Since the act of 
providing security here had as a reasonably foreseeable consequence the 
infliction of abuse on the people of Myanmar, the company could certainly be 
considered to be the proximate cause of those violations.129 
2. The three alternative tests. 
In addition to the joint action test, several other tests under § 1983 could be 
used to impugn responsibility for human rights abuses onto multinational 
companies. The Unocal decision did not discuss any of these tests. Since the 
door has been left open in this regard, it seems likely that future plaintiffs might 
marshal facts to try to satisfy one of the following three tests: 
a. Public function. 
The public function doctrine holds that if the private entity is engaging in a 
traditionally governmental function with respect to the plaintiff, then it may be 
considered to be a state actor.130 Under this test, if liability were to attach in 
energy company cases, the venture in which the company was participating 
would have to be considered a traditionally governmental function. In some 
cases, this criterion might readily be met. For example, some governments 
own and control substantial portions of oil industrial operations in their 
countries.131 Ventures of this nature might fairly be characterized as a 
traditional governmental function in such a country. One limiting issue might 
be the standard a court used to judge a traditional governmental function: 
Would it have to be a traditional governmental function in the United States, or 
a traditional governmental function in the country where the violation takes 
place? 
127. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000). 
128. Forcese, supra note 13, at 512. 
129. Id. at 513. 
130. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996). 
131. Zia-Zarifi, supra note 10, at 138. 
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b. Nexus. 
The nexus test holds that there must be a sufficiently close relationship 
between the state and the challenged actions of the regulated entity so that it is 
fair to treat the actions by the entity as actions of the state itself.132 This might 
be characterized as a symbiotic relationship. State regulation alone does not 
convert the activity of a private actor into state activity.133 The inquiry under 
this test seems to be very situation~specific.134 For ATCA plaintiffs, a threshold 
matter under this test would be proving some sort of regulation by the foreign 
state. Beyond that, the factors used in the inquiry become less clear. Some 
cases hold that the state must have some involvement in the decision to commit 
the alleged violations. 135 Others consider whether the actions were traditionally 
public functions or could make the state a partner in the private actor's 
enterprise.136 The major shortcoming of this test is simply that most courts 
seem reluctant to conclude that it is satisfied, probably because the Supreme 
Court itself seems to have attempted to limit the test to situations where the 
involvement between the two actors is extremely significant.137 Many courts 
seem to view the scope of the test as only extending to situations where both 
parties benefited not just from their overall relationship, but also from the 
wrongful act itself.138 In other words, to be assured a reasonable chance of 
success under this test, plaintiffs would have to persuade a court that both the 
foreign government and the multinational company benefited from their abuse. 
c. State compulsion. 
The state compulsion test says that a private entity acts as the state when its 
actions are compelled under state law or state custom.139 Here, plaintiffs would 
have to prove that state law somehow compelled the energy companies' 
participation in the illegal ventures. Conceivably, an ATCA plaintiff might 
argue that such a company has to follow the laws that a foreign state establishes 
with respect to such ventures; if these laws mandated certain behaviors that led 
to the challenged acts, then they might meet the state compulsion test. 
132. Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improv. & Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 
506 (9th Cir. 1989). 
133. MooseLodgeNo.107v.Irvis,407U.S.163, 176-77(1972). 
134. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). 
135. See, e.g., George, 91 F.3d at 1230-31. 
136. See, e.g., Gorenc, 869 F.2d at 506. 
137. Forcese, supra note 13, at 504. 
138. Id. 
139. Gorenc, 869 F.2d at 508. 
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3. Special issues with§ 1983 doctrine. 
All three of the alternative doctrines, like the joint action test, seem to deal 
with action by the private entity, and not the state. The fact that these tests only 
seem to apply when the private actor itself is committing the violation 
highlights one preliminary issue. If it is indeed the private company itself that 
is committing the violation, it may be unnecessary in some cases to even reach 
the state action inquiry at all. If the violations rise to a sufficiently egregious 
level, then the Unocal case indicates that a private actor may be liable in its 
own right if it has taken "active steps" in committing those violations. In cases 
where the allegations include things like forced labor, which courts have 
equated with slavery, then any company actively participating in these events is 
liable in its capacity as a private actor and will not have to meet a state action 
test at all. As noted previously, however, the bar for active participation is 
fairly high. 140 
In cases like Unocal, the harm is actually inflicted by the foreign 
governments, not by the energy company itself. Under all of the current§ 1983 
tests, the private company would probably have to be the proximate cause of 
the violation under such circumstances.141 If Judge Lew's decision is upheld, 
this standard would probably mean establishing that the private company 
exercised some power of control over the decision making of the state actors. 
These doctrines therefore seem insufficient to establish liability in most cases. 
Using § 1983, therefore, seems to significantly work to the advantage of 
multinational energy companies behaving questionably. 
There seems to be some intuitive problem, however, with applying the 
§ 1983 doctrine at all. As noted, the law seems to contemplate situations where 
the actions themselves are committed by a private actor who bears some 
imprimatur of the state actor. The instances involving multinational energy 
companies and abusive foreign governments, in contrast, are situations where 
the actions are committed instead by a state actor who bears some imprimatur 
of the private actor. Applying § 1983 in these cases, therefore, requires an 
inversion of the usual relationships found in color of state law cases.142 
B. Other Standards of Licibility 
The chances of success for future plaintiffs under§ 1983 seem relatively 
slim. The question remains whether using§ 1983 as the measuring stick for 
responsibility is appropriate at all. Several other standards could be imported 
140. See note 107, supra, and accompanying text. 
141. At least if Ninth Circuit precedent is followed. See, e.g., Brower v. Inyo County, 
817 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1987); Kingv. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1986). 
142. Forcese, supra note 13, at 510. 
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into ATCA doctrine. Such alternatives could be imported from either 
international law or from the federal law of the United States. 
Some commentators contend that the most logical source for a standard of 
responsibility under the ATCA comes from international law itself. Since the 
ATCA imports international standards to define the nature of an ATCA 
violation, the argument goes, it would be most logical to import international 
standards of responsibility in order to judge those violations. 143 While this line 
of reasoning is appealing in the sense that it might make discovering the proper 
responsibility standard relatively easy, it is certainly not the logical necessity 
that its proponents would make it seem. 
Importing international violation standards under the ATCA does not 
compel the importation of international responsibility standards. A better way 
to conceptualize the function of the international violation standards is as an 
outer boundary. In other words, the United States does not have an inherent 
duty to make its courts available to aliens for international violations. The 
ATCA, however, expresses a policy in favor of providing a forum in the United 
States for such wrongdoings. The question remains open as to what constitutes 
an international violation, and it is up to the courts to construct an acceptable 
definition. In looking to define what might be the appropriate kind of 
violations to be heard in this type of forum, the courts in the United States have 
chosen only those wrongs that are so egregious that they are universally 
condemned. Other sorts of international harms are not included. The courts 
effectively are expressing a willingness to entertain international claims of this 
high magnitude, but nothing less. The use of international standards, therefore, 
seems to have a limiting effect on the kinds of cases heard by U.S. federal 
courts. 
In contrast, importing international liability standards seems to operate 
more expansively. In effect, it would convert the federal courts into 
international tribunals that happen to be located within the United States. Such 
international standards, rather than helping the federal courts ascertain when 
something is so terrible that they should open their limited forum, seem merely 
to unnecessarily invade the courts' discretion with respect to the types of cases 
they \vill consider. For one thing, the standards provided as to international 
violations fill in a true gap in the law-the United States does not seem to have 
a pre-existing definition of what constitutes a justiciable international violation. 
Such a gap, however, does not exist with respect to doctrines of responsibility. 
The United States has a fully developed body of law on when actors are 
responsible for harms. This seems especially true when the actors at issue are 
American-the United States already has a set of pre-existing liability 
standards to apply if those same actors were being sued for events that took 
place on their home soil. 
143. Id. at 502. 
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Additionally, importing international liability standards directly contradicts 
the policy behind importing international jus cogens norms for judging 
violations. As previously noted, the policy behind using jus cogens norms 
seems to be that the courts want to open their doors on a limited basis. Had the 
courts wanted to import international law wholesale into their chambers, they 
would not have constructed such a strict test for what constitutes an actionable 
violation. In contrast, adopting international standards of responsibility would 
seem to indicate a more deferential attitude toward the authority of 
international law generally, since it allows international law to usurp the 
authority of standards already developed in American federal courts. The 
federal courts simply do not seem to view international standards in such a 
manner. 
Accordingly, the alternative standards that build on responsibility concepts 
already existing in federal law seem to be stronger hooks on which an ATCA 
plaintiff could hang her case. Likewise, such American standards also seem to 
be more logical guidelines for American energy companies to follow when 
assessing their actions in foreign countries. Several examples are explored 
below. 
1. State responsibility. 
One possible option would be to hold private actors to the same standard as 
a sovereign nation might face. This standard was addressed in a famous 
environmental suit, known as The Trail Smelter Case, involving a dispute 
between the United States and Canada. A private Canadian mining and 
smelting company was operating a smelter just north of the border between 
British Columbia and the state of Washington. Pollution from the smelter did 
significant damage in Washington.144 Eventually Canada and the United States 
set up a commission to deal with the problem.145 In handing down its final · 
decision, the tribunal formed by the commission noted, "A State owes at all 
times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by individuals from 
within its jurisdiction. " 146 The tribunal found that Canada was responsible for 
the conduct of the private company and had the duty to bring this conauct 
within internationally recognized legal norms. 141 
State responsibility for actors is a concept that is relatively developed in 
international law generally. A recent decision by the International Criminal 
Tribunal of Yugoslavia also provides guidance in interpreting when a state 
144. The Trail Smelter Case (1941), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-jaysmith/ 
Trail.html. 
145. Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at 
Trail, British Columbia, April IS, 1935, U.S.-Can., U.S. Treaty Series 893. 
146. The Trail Smelter Case, supra note 144. 
147. Id. 
June2002] ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 1381 
might be held liable for actors within its province.148 The standards seem to 
vary according to the nature of the party committing the action. When the actor 
in question is a military or paramilitary organization, all that must be proved is 
that the state exercises control over the organization by equipping and 
:financing it, as well as helping with its general coordination. It is not 
necessary, however, that the state itself be the source for the particular orders 
that lead to the commission of the alleged harm.149 
Hypothetically, this standard could be applied in some cases. A private 
energy company might, in extraordinary circumstances, be found to have a duty 
to protect against injury from state actors. Several complications with 
importing this standard, however, seem evident. First, it would be necessary to 
determine what the "jurisdiction" of such private companies might be. Perhaps 
if the company had entered into agreements with the state actors, then those 
actors might fairly be characterized as within the company's jurisdiction. 
Second, the degree of control a private company may exercise over a foreign 
government seems considerably less than what a sovereign state might exercise 
over its own citizenry. Without such tools as criminal and civil law at its 
behest, the best leverage that such a company seems to have is :financial, such 
as the \vithdrawal of funding for the project. Third, a court would have to 
determine that a private duty to control existed under international law. 
Considering the relatively low degree of control a company like Unocal would 
exercise over a state military regime like SLORC, it is difficult to imagine that 
any court would be willing to find such a duty. 
This last problem highlights a larger weakness with importing the state 
responsibility standard in this instance. Just as with the § 1983 analysis, 
importing state responsibility requires that the court be prepared to substitute a 
private actor where the doctrine requires a state actor. It makes little sense to 
replace the § 1983 doctrine with one that does not cure the problems that 
doctrine had raised. 
Additionally, as noted previously, replacing pre-existing federal doctrines 
\vith international concepts seems to go against the policy of limited 
availability expressed by the courts in importing jus cogens norms to define 
ATCA violations. By importing a state responsibility standard to replace § 
1983, the courts would seem to weaken their own authority to develop their 
own standards for judging ATCA cases. 
2. Joint liability for a tort. 
With respect to directing or permitting conduct of another, the Restatement 
Second of Torts says in part: 
148. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, IT-94-1-A (July 15, 
1999), as discussed in Forcese, supra note 13, at 508. 
149. Forcese, supra note 13, at 508. 
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For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability if he: 
(a) orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or should know of 
circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own, 
or (b) conducts an activity with the aid of the other and is negligent in 
employing him, or (c) permits the other to act upon his premises or 
with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know that the 
other is acting or will act tortiously .... 150 
This standard, if applied to defendants in an ATCA case, could lead a court 
in some cases to find such companies responsible for serious human rights 
violations committed by state entities in furtherance of their projects. With 
respect to part (a), it would not be necessary for a company to order or request 
that a state actor like SLORC commit the violations benefiting the project. If 
the company knew that the state was committing violations in furthering the 
particular ends of the venture, then all that would be necessary would be facts 
that proved the company had ordered or requested that those ends be furthered, 
knowing that the conduct that follows is liable to be tortious. 151 For example, if 
Unocal directed the SLORC military to provide security for a certain portion of 
its project, and Unocal knew or should have known that the military was likely 
to commit human rights violations in the course of providing that security, this 
would make Unocal liable for those actions. 
For part (b), the theory is that a company might be subject to liability for 
negligent hiring-that is, if the company had reason to know that someone it 
hired was dangerous, retaining that person could be considered negligent.152 
Responsibility under this standard in some cases might depend on whether 
other members of a joint venture might be considered employees for this 
purpose. It seems reasonable to view "military protection," such as that 
provided by SLORC to Unocal in the terms of their contract, as employment by 
those companies, since SLORC was providing Unocal with the particular 
service of security. It would seem to impute responsibility in any case where 
such companies were paying governmental agencies to provide such services to 
them in their project operations. 
Under part (c), a company might be liable for violations if they take place 
on land the company owns, or if it owns any of the property used in committing 
the violations, provided that it has reason to know that its property is being 
used in such a way. Therefore, any inappropriate use of project equipment by 
the state actors might be a source of liability for the oil companies. 
Joint liability for a tort, therefore, could be a potentially potent weapon 
against multinational oil companies. The most significant change in the 
150. REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 877 (1965). 
151. See id. at cmt. a. 
152 See id. at cmt. c; Koehring v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ill. 
1966). 
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responsibility standard would be a shift away from active participation in the 
violation. In fact, the standard implied here is even weaker than a requirement 
of actual knowledge; instead, it is the traditional "should have known" 
negligence standard of responsibility. A defendant such as Unocal could 
clearly be held responsible under this kind of standard, since it knew that such 
human rights violations had taken place. 
Another interesting aspect of this particular standard is that it would hold 
American oil companies to the same standard they would face at home. It 
seems anomalous that an American company could be responsible for negligent 
torts against American citizens, but would incur no liability for participating in 
and profiting from conduct by states abroad that constitutes gross human rights 
abuses. Using the standard for joint liability would correct this disparity and 
remove an incentive for misbehavior abroad. 
One potential problem, however, in using this test is precisely that it 
employs a negligence standard. Mere negligence as a cause of action itself has 
been rejected as insufficient under the ATCA.153 Violations that have been 
considered sufficient have all been of the intentional variety-genocide and 
torture and the like. Whether a party could be held responsible for negligent 
participation in an intentional tort under this view of the ATCA is a difficult 
question. 
3. Accomplice liability. 
Another possible way to judge whether a private company can be held 
liable for a state actor's violation is accomplice liability in the criminal law. 
There are two fonns of accomplice liability to consider: liability as a 
conspirator and liability for aiding and abetting. Because the ATCA is a 
federal statute, it is probably most appropriate to examine the federal standards 
for accomplice liability. 
To prove conspiracy in federal criminal cases, the government must show: 
(1) an agreement (2) to engage in criminal activity and (3) one or more overt 
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.154 If this standard were imported into 
ATCA jurisprudence, plaintiffs could satisfy the last element either by showing 
overt acts by the state actor or the private company. 
The conspiracy test might be a bit daunting for plaintiffs to satisfy. It 
might be relatively easy to prove that an agreement of some sort exists between 
private energy companies and the offending governmental organizations-
especially when they are involved in a joint venture. Whether such agreements 
are to engage in criminal activity is a more difficult matter. As Judge Lew said 
in his opinion, the companies and the governmental organizations will often 
153. Sofaer, supra note 30, at 12. 
154. United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000); see 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(2002). 
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have the common goal of a "profitable project."155 This common goal does not 
itself constitute criminal activity, and Judge Lew reasoned that simply agreeing 
upon this goal and no other would be insufficient to establish a conspiracy.156 
Conspiracy seems to require that the parties agree that the ends to achieve such 
a legitimate goal would be of the kind that violated the ATCA standard. In 
cases like Unocal, where the evidence merely established knowledge of the 
illegal practices, this seems a difficult standard to prove. Judge Lew rejected 
the notion that the plaintiffs had proved a conspiracy in that case.157 
There is support, however, for the proposition that knowledge of the 
criminal objectives satisfies the conspiracy test. Knowledge of the illegal 
design may be proved through circumstantial evidence.158 If a defendant was 
aware of the violations by its governmental partner and still participated in the 
venture in order to profit from those violations, it might be fair to infer that the 
company had implicitly agreed to accept actions that resulted in those illegal 
ends. 
A more dangerous test for multinationals under accomplice liability might 
be the test for aiding and abetting. In federal criminal cases, the government 
proves this by establishing that the defendant participated in the criminal 
venture and intentionally assisted the venture's illegal purpose.159 Additionally, 
if a defendant "knew, but did not care" that the other person was conducting 
illegal activities, but continued to help, then he might be considered an 
accomplice.160 Such a standard might be enough to snare defendants like 
Unocal. Arguably, mere knowledge of the violations by the governmental 
partners would be enough, provided that the company continued to engage in 
activities that helped those governmental actors carry on those violations. 
Continuing to fund and build the projects could satisfy that requirement-
entering the joint venture helps organizations like SLORC commit the 
violations because it gives them an end to which to direct their forced labor. 
Additionally, the resources contributed by the oil companies make it possible 
for the questionable projects to continue. 
The appropriateness of accomplice liability also finds support in 
international law. The concept of "complicitous guilt" clearly exists at 
international law, and it was in fact relied upon in the recent ICTY decision.161 
That case detailed a "common design" theory of accomplice liability: if the two 
actors form a common design to pursue one course of conduct, and one actor 
155. Unocal V, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. 
156. Id. at 1306-07. Judge Lew had stated that proving a conspiracy would satisfy the 
joint action test. 
157. Id. 
158. Wright, 215 F.3d at 1028. 
159. United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 340, 352 {9th Cir. 1986). 
160. See United States v. Wrobel, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7289 (9th Cir. April 2, 
2001). 
161. Forcese, supra note 13, at 500. 
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performs an act that falls outside the common design but is a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of the action, then the other actor might be liable. 
Foreseeability here would require that the second actor be aware that the 
actions of the other person were most likely to result in that outcome.162 Noting 
that this standard exists does not imply that the federal courts should be 
compelled to adopt this particular complicity standard. It merely suggests that 
the adoption of a complicity standard is appropriate not only because it exists in 
federal law, but also because it is supported internationally. 
One objection to incorporating either of the accomplice liability standards 
is that those doctrines have been built up through criminal law, not civil law. 
This concern, however, seems misplaced. First, the vast majority of the 
violations that take place under the ATCA are acts that would be criminal in 
U.S. courts. The fact that they are also intentional torts is relevant only to the 
extent that it permits private parties to bring these claims in civil eourt as well. 
Additionally, the standard used in criminal cases is much stricter than that used 
in civil cases. If a party could be convicted of being an accomplice to a crime, 
it would seem paradoxical not to hold that same party responsible for the same 
actions under the less rigorous civil standard. 
CONCLUSION 
In examlillllg the growing jurisprudence on the relationship between 
multinational oil companies and human rights violations, several conclusions 
seem apparent. First, much of the doctrine is new and evolving. Cases 
involving these issues have only arisen in a few circuits, and none of these 
cases has even proceeded to the stage of a trial. Additionally, some of the 
decisions-most notably the current Unocal decision based on the § 1983 
responsibility standard-have not yet been confirmed at an appellate level; 
none of the cases have reached the Supreme Court. While many of the relevant 
considerations, such as forum non conveniens, are older doctrines with 
established roots in federal case law, their application to human 
rights/multinational company cases is novel. Based on these facts, the potential 
for liability could change dramatically as the cases progress. 
Second, as scholars and practitioners have previously noted, codification of 
a standard for multinational companies would be a vast improvement over the 
current state of affairs. First, it would give courts a clearer basis for deciding 
these types of cases. Second, it would give private companies like Unocal a 
guide as to what their behavior should be. Pressure from human rights groups 
and an increasing trend by other companies to pull out of countries like 
Myanmar may contribute to a new reluctance by such companies to stay 
involved in potentially problematic operations. A more clearly defined statute, 
such as the TVP A, would help these companies make better judgments. 
162. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, para. 220, as quoted in Forcese, supra note 13, at 501. 
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Companies like Unocal purport to believe that economic engagement with 
oppressive governments is a better alternative to isolation in terms of trying to 
change the social and political conditions of those countries.163 A statute would 
encourage these companies to develop operating standards that encouraged 
such positive engagement, instead of potential abuse. 
Third, the current Unocal standard of responsibility may not be the correct 
one. It seems ironic that § 1983, an important tool for domestic civil rights 
litigation, might slam the door on future human rights litigation. Additionally, 
it seems strange that a test traditionally used to impute state responsibility onto 
private action is used in a situation where the state itself is actually acting. As 
this Note has suggested, several alternatives to that standard exist. These 
doctrines would be more likely to assign responsibility for these violations to 
multinationals like Unocal. A change in the doctrine would certainly be bad for 
such companies, in the sense that plaintiffs would more easily be able to hold 
them liable. However, two such alternatives-joint liability for a tort and 
accomplice liability-do seem to be more logical doctrines to import into 
ATCA jurisprudence. Additionally, the current § 1983 doctrine may be 
incorrectly and incompletely interpreted. Multinationals should be aware of the 
potential for change in their post-Unocal legal responsibilities. Whether the 
Ninth Circuit changes the standard in the pending appeal remains to be seen. 
One thing, however, seems certain: until and unless a definitive standard 
becomes codified or more firmly entrenched in precedent, multinational 
companies cannot reliably gauge the circumstances under which they will be 
held liable for human rights violations. They are left to decide in each case if 
their expensive investments abroad are worth the gamble. 
163. The Story You Haven't Heard About Unocal in Myanmar, at 
http://www.unocal.com/myanmar/index.htm. 
